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Abstract
The cornerstone underpinning deep learning is the
guarantee that gradient descent on an objective
converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this
guarantee fails in settings, such as generative ad-
versarial nets, where there are multiple interacting
losses. The behavior of gradient-based methods
in games is not well understood – and is becoming
increasingly important as adversarial and multi-
objective architectures proliferate. In this paper,
we develop new techniques to understand and con-
trol the dynamics in general games. The key result
is to decompose the second-order dynamics into
two components. The first is related to potential
games, which reduce to gradient descent on an im-
plicit function; the second relates to Hamiltonian
games, a new class of games that obey a conser-
vation law, akin to conservation laws in classical
mechanical systems. The decomposition moti-
vates Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA), a
new algorithm for finding stable fixed points in
general games. Basic experiments show SGA is
competitive with recently proposed algorithms for
finding stable fixed points in GANs – whilst at
the same time being applicable to – and having
guarantees in – much more general games.
1. Introduction
Recent progress in machine learning is heavily dependent on
using gradient descent, applied to optimize the parameters
of models with respect to a (single) objectives. A basic
result is that gradient descent converges to a local minimum
of the objective under a broad range of conditions (Lee et al.,
2017). However, there is a rapidly growing set of powerful
models that do not optimize a single objective, including:
generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
proximal gradient TD learning (Liu et al., 2016), multi-level
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optimization (Pfau & Vinyals, 2016), synthetic gradients
(Jaderberg et al., 2017), hierarchical reinforcement learning
(Wayne & Abbott, 2014; Vezhnevets et al., 2017), curiosity
(Pathak et al., 2017), and imaginative agents (Racanie`re
et al., 2017). In effect, the models are trained via games
played by cooperating and competing modules.
No-regret algorithms such as gradient descent are guaran-
teed to converge to coarse correlated equilibria in games
(Stoltz & Lugosi, 2007). However, the dynamics do not
converge to Nash equilibria – and do not even stabilize –
in general (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018). Concretely, cyclic
behaviors emerge even in simple cases, see example 1.
This paper presents an analysis of the second-order structure
of game dynamics that allows to identify two classes of
games, potential and Hamiltonian, that are easy to solve
separately. We then derive symplectic gradient adjustment
(SGA), a method for finding stable fixed points in games.
SGA’s performance is evaluated in basic experiments.
Background and problem description. Procedures that
converge to Nash equilibria have been found for restricted
game classes: potential games, 2-player zero-sum games
and a few others (Hu & Wellman, 2003; Hart & Mas-Colell,
2013). Finding equilibria can be reformulated as a nonlinear
complementarity problem, but these are ‘hopelessly imprac-
tical to solve’ in general (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008)
because the problem is PPAD hard (Daskalakis et al., 2009).
Players are primarily neural nets in our setting. We there-
fore restrict to gradient-based methods (game-theorists have
considered a much broader range of techniques). Losses are
not necessarily convex in any of their parameters, so Nash
equilibria do not necessarily exist. Leaving existence aside,
finding Nash equilibria is analogous to, but much harder
than, finding global minima in neural nets – which is not
realistic with gradient-based methods.
There are (at least) three problems with gradient descent in
games. Firstly, the potential existence of cycles (recurrent
dynamics) implies there are no convergence guarantees,
see example 1 and Mertikopoulos et al. (2018). Secondly,
even when gradient descent converges, the rate may be
too slow in practice because ‘rotational forces’ necessitate
extremely small learning rates (see figure 3). Finally, since
there is no single objective, there is no way to measure
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progress. Application-specific proxies have been proposed,
for example the inception score for GANs (Salimans et al.,
2016), but these are little help during training – the inception
score is no substitute for looking at samples.
Outline and summary of main contributions. We start
with the well-known case of a zero-sum bimatrix game: ex-
ample 1. It turns out that the dynamics (that is, the dynamics
under simultaneous gradient descent) can be reformulated
via Hamilton’s equations. The cyclic behavior arises be-
cause the dynamics live on the level sets of the Hamiltonian.
More directly useful, gradient descent on the Hamiltonian
converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 shows that the Hessian of any game decomposes
into symmetric and antisymmetric components. There are
thus two ‘pure’ cases: when only the symmetric compo-
nent is present, or only the antisymmetric. The first case,
known as potential games (Monderer & Shapley, 1996),
have been intensively studied because they are exactly the
games where gradient descent does converge.
The second case, Hamiltonian1 games, were not studied
previously, probably because they coincide with zero-sum
games in the bimatrix case (or constant-sum, depending
on the constraints). Zero-sum and Hamiltonian games dif-
fer when the losses are not bilinear or there are more than
two players. Hamiltonian games are important because
(i) they are easy to solve and (ii) general games combine
potential-like and Hamiltonian-like dynamics. The concept
of a zero-sum game is too loose to be useful when there are
many players: any n-player game can be reformulated as
a zero-sum (n+ 1)-player game where `n+1 = −
∑n
i=1 `i.
Zero-sum games are as complicated as general-sum games.
Theorem 3 shows that Hamiltonian games obey a conserva-
tion law – which also provides the key to solving them, by
gradient descent on the conserved quantity.
The general case, neither potential nor Hamiltonian, is more
difficult and the focus of the remainder of the paper. Sec-
tion 3 proposes symplectic gradient adjustment (SGA), a
gradient-based method for finding stable fixed points in gen-
eral games. Appendix C contains TensorFlow code to com-
pute the adjustment. The algorithm computes two Hessian-
vector products, at a cost of two iterations of backprop. SGA
satisfies a few natural desiderata: D1 it is compatible with
the original dynamics and D2, D3 it is guaranteed to find
stable equilibria in potential and Hamiltonian games.
For general games, correctly picking the sign of the ad-
justment (whether to add or subtract) is critical since it
determines the behavior near stable and unstable equilibria.
Section 2.3 defines stable equilibria and relates them to local
Nash equilibria. Lemma 10 then shows how to set the sign
so as to converge to stable fixed points. Correctly aligning
1Lu (1992) defined an unrelated notion of Hamiltonian game.
SGA allows higher learning rates and faster, more robust
convergence, see theorem 7 and experiments in section 4.
Section 4 investigates a basic GAN setup from Metz et al.
(2017), that tests for mode-collapse and mode hopping.
Whereas simultaneous gradient descent completely fails; the
symplectic adjustment leads to rapid convergence – slightly
improved by correctly choosing the sign of the adjustment.
Finally, section 3.5 applies the same criterion to align con-
sensus optimization (Mescheder et al., 2017), preventing
it from converging to unstable equilibria and (slightly) im-
proving performance, figure 9 in the appendix.
Caveat. The behavior of SGA near fixed points that are
neither negative nor positive semi-definite is not analysed.
On the one hand, it was only recently shown that gradient
descent behaves well near saddles when optimizing a sin-
gle objective (Lee et al., 2016; 2017). On the other hand,
Newton’s method is attracted to saddles, see analysis and re-
cently proposed remedy in Dauphin et al. (2014). Studying
indefinite fixed points is deferred to future work.
Related work. Convergence to Nash equilibria in two-
player games was studied in Singh et al. (2000). WoLF (Win
or Learn Fast) converges to Nash equilibria in two-player
two-action games (Bowling & Veloso, 2002). Extensions
include weighted policy learning (Abdallah & Lesser, 2008)
and GIGA-WoLF (Bowling, 2004). There has been almost
no work on convergence to fixed points in general games.
Optimistic mirror descent approximately converges in two-
player bilinear zero-sum games (Daskalakis et al., 2018), a
special case of Hamiltonian games. In more general settings
it converges to coarse correlated equilibria.
There has been interesting recent work on convergence
in GANs. Heusel et al. (2017) propose a two-time scale
methods to find Nash. However, it likely scales badly with
the number of players. Nagarajan & Kolter (2017) prove
convergence for some algorithms, but under very strong
assumptions Mescheder (2018). Consensus optimization
(Mescheder et al., 2017) is discussed in section 3. Learning
with opponent-learning awareness (LOLA) infinitesimally
modifies the objectives of players to take into account their
opponents’ goals (Foerster et al., 2018). However, there are
no guarantees that LOLA converges and in general it may
modify the fixed-points of the game.
Notation. Dot products are written as vᵀw or 〈v,w〉. The
angle between vectors is θ(v,w). Positive definiteness is
denoted S  0. Omitted proofs are in appendix B.
2. The infinitesimal structure of games
In contrast to the classical formulation of games, we do not
constrain the parameter sets (e.g. to the probability simplex)
or require losses to be convex in the corresponding players’
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Figure 1. (A) ξ cycles around the origin. (B) gradient descent on
H converges to Nash.
parameters. Players could be interacting neural nets such as
GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Definition 1. A game is a set of players [n] = {1, . . . , n}
and twice continuously differentiable losses {`i : Rd →
R}ni=1. Parameters are w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈ Rd with
wi ∈ Rdi where
∑n
i=1 di = d. . Player i controls wi.
It is sometimes convenient to write w = (wi,w−i) where
w−i concatenates the parameters of all the players other than
the ith, which is placed out of order by abuse of notation.
The simultaneous gradient is the gradient of the losses with
respect to the parameters of the respective players:
ξ(w) = (∇w1`1, . . . ,∇wn`n) ∈ Rd.
By the dynamics of the game, we mean following the nega-
tive of the vector field ξ with infinitesimal steps. There is
no reason to expect ξ to be the gradient of a single function
in general, and therefore no reason to expect the dynamics
to converge to a fixed point.
2.1. Warmup: Hamiltonian mechanics in games
The next example illustrates the essential problem with gra-
dients in games and the key insight motivating our approach.
Example 1 (Conservation of energy in a zero-sum un-
constrained bimatrix game). Zero-sum games, where∑n
i=1 `i ≡ 0, are well-studied. The zero-sum game
`1(x,y) = x
ᵀAy and `2(x,y) = −xᵀAy
has Nash equilibrium at (x,y) = (0,0). The simultaneous
gradient ξ(x,y) = (Ay,−Aᵀx) rotates around the Nash,
see figure 1.
The matrix A admits singular value decomposition (SVD)
A = UᵀDV. Changing to coordinates u = D
1
2Ux and
v = D
1
2Vy gives `1/2(u,v) = ±uᵀv. Introduce the
Hamiltonian
H = 1
2
(‖u‖22 + ‖v‖22) = 12 (xᵀUᵀDUx+ yᵀVᵀDVy) .
Remarkably, the dynamics can be reformulated via Hamil-
ton’s equations in the coordinates given by the SVD of A:
ξ(u,v) =
(
∂H
∂v
,−∂H
∂u
)
.
Vector field ξ cycles around the equilibrium because ξ con-
serves the Hamiltonian’s level sets (i.e. 〈ξ,∇H〉 = 0). How-
ever, gradient descent on the Hamiltonian converges to
the Nash equilibrium. The remainder of the paper explores
the implications and limitations of this insight.
Papadimitriou & Piliouras (2016) recently analyzed the dy-
namics of Matching Pennies (essentially, the above example)
and showed with some effort that the cyclic behavior covers
the entire parameter space. The Hamiltonian reformulation
directly explains the cyclic behavior via a conservation law.
2.2. The generalized Helmholtz decomposition
The Hessian of a game is the (d × d)-matrix of second-
derivatives H(w) := ∇w · ξ(w)ᵀ =
(
∂ξα(w)
∂wβ
)d
α,β=1
. Con-
cretely, the Hessian can be written
H(w) =

∇2w1`1 ∇2w1,w2`1 · · · ∇2w1,wn`1
∇2w2,w1`2 ∇2w2`2 · · · ∇2w2,wn`2
...
...
∇2wn,w1`n ∇2wn,w2`n · · · ∇2wn`n
 ,
where ∇2wi,wj `k is the (di × dj)-block of 2nd-order deriva-
tives. The Hessian of a game is not necessarily symmetric.
Note: α, β run over dimensions; i, j run over players.
Lemma 1 (generalized Helmholtz decomposition). The
Hessian of any vector field decomposes uniquely into two
components H(w) = S(w) + A(w) where S ≡ Sᵀ is
symmetric and A+Aᵀ ≡ 0 is antisymmetric.
Proof. Any matrix decomposes uniquely as M = S + A
where S = 12 (M + M
ᵀ) and A = 12 (M −Mᵀ) are sym-
metric and antisymmetric. Applying the decomposition to
the game Hessian yields the result.
The decomposition is preserved by orthogonal change-of-
coordinates PᵀMP = PᵀSP + PᵀAP since the terms
remain symmetric and antisymmetric.
The connection to the classical Helmholtz decomposition in
calculus is sketched in appendix E. Two obvious classes of
games arise from the decomposition:
Definition 2. A game is a potential game if A(w) ≡ 0. It
is a Hamiltonian game if S(w) ≡ 0.
Potential games are well-studied and easy to solve. Hamil-
tonian games are a new class of games that are also easy to
solve. The general case is more delicate, see section 3.
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2.3. Stable fixed points
Gradient-based methods can reliably find local – but not
global – optima of nonconvex objective functions (Lee et al.,
2016; 2017). Similarly, gradient-based methods cannot be
expected to find global Nash equilibria in games.
Definition 3. A fixed point w∗, with ξ(w∗) = 0, is sta-
ble if S(w)  0 and unstable if S(w) ≺ 0 for w in a
neighborhood of w∗.
Fixed points that are neither positive nor negative definite
are beyond the scope of the paper.
Lemma 2 (Stable fixed points are local Nash equilibria). A
point w∗ is a local Nash equilibrium if, for all i, there
is a neighborhood Ui of w∗i such that `i(wi,w
∗
−i) ≥
`i(w
∗
i ,w
∗
−i) for wi ∈ Ui. If fixed point w∗ is stable then it
is a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If S is positive semidefinite then so are its (di × di)-
submatrices Si := ∇2wi`i for all i. The result follows.
Appendix A contains more details on local Nash equilibria.
2.4. Potential games
Potential games were introduced in Monderer & Shapley
(1996). A game is a potential game if there is a single
potential function φ : Rd → R and positive numbers {αi >
0}ni=1 such that
φ(w′i,w−i)−φ(w′′i ,w−i) = αi
(
`i(w
′
i,w−i)−`i(w′′i ,w−i)
)
for all i and all w′i,w
′′
i ,w−i. Monderer & Shapley (1996)
show a game is a potential game iff αi∇wi`i = ∇wiφ for
all i, which is equivalent to
αi∇2wiwj `i = αj∇2wiwj `j = αj
(
∇2wjwi`j
)ᵀ
∀i, j.
Our definition of potential game is the special case where
αi = 1 for all i, which Monderer & Shapley (1996) call
an exact potential game. We use the shorthand ‘potential
game’ to refer to exact potential games in what follows.
Potential games have been extensively studied since they
are one of the few classes of games for which Nash equilib-
ria can be computed (Rosenthal, 1973). For our purposes,
they are games where simultaneous gradient descent on the
losses is gradient descent on a single function. It follows
that descent on ξ converges to a fixed point that is a local
minimum of φ – or saddle, but see Lee et al. (2017).
2.5. Hamiltonian games
A concrete example may help understand antisymmetric ma-
trices. Suppose n competitors play one-on-one and that the
probability of player i beating player j is pij . Then, assum-
ing there are no draws, the probabilities satisfy pij+pji = 1
and pii = 12 . The matrix A =
(
log
pij
1−pij
)n
i,j=1
of logits
is then antisymmetric. Intuitively, antisymmetry reflects a
hyperadversarial setting where all pairwise interactions be-
tween players are zero-sum. In general, Hamiltonian games
are related to – but distinct from – zero-sum games.
Example 2 (an unconstrained2 bimatrix game is zero–
sum iff it is Hamiltonian). Consider bimatrix game with
`1(x,y) = x
ᵀPy and `2(x,y) = xᵀQy. Then ξ =
(Py,Qᵀx) and the Hessian components have block struc-
ture
2A =
(
0 P−Q
(Q−P)ᵀ 0
)
2S =
(
0 P+Q
(P+Q)ᵀ 0
)
The game is Hamiltonian iff S = 0 iff P + Q = 0 iff
`1 + `2 = 0.
There are Hamiltonian games that are not zero-sum and vice
versa.
Example 3 (Hamiltonian game that is not zero-sum). Fix
constants a and b and suppose players 1 and 2 minimize
losses
`1(x, y) = x(y − b) and `2(x, y) = −(x− a)y
with respect to x and y respectively.
Example 4 (zero-sum game that is not Hamiltonian). Play-
ers 1 and 2 minimize
`1(x, y) = x
2 + y2 `2(x, y) = −(x2 + y2).
The game actually has potential function φ(x, y) = x2−y2.
Hamiltonian games are quite different from potential games.
There is a Hamiltonian function H that specifies a con-
served quantity. Whereas the dynamics equal ∇φ in po-
tential games; they are orthogonal to ∇H in Hamiltonian
games. The orthogonality implies the conservation law that
underlies the cyclic behavior in example 1.
Theorem 3. LetH(w) := 12‖ξ(w)‖22. If the game is Hamil-
tonian then (i) ∇H = Aᵀξ and (ii) ξ preserves the level
sets of H since 〈ξ,∇H〉 = 0. If the Hessian is invertible
and lim‖w‖→∞H(w) = ∞ then (iii) gradient descent on
H converges to a local Nash equilibrium.
In fact,H is a Hamiltonian3 function for the game dynamics.
We use the notation H(w) = 12‖ξ(w)‖2 throughout the
paper. However,H is only a Hamiltonian function for ξ if
the game is Hamiltonian.
2The parameters in bimatrix games are usually constrained to
the probability simplex.
3Notation: H for Hamiltonian; H for Hessian.
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Figure 2. Infinitesimal alignment is positive (cyan) when small
positive λ either: (A) pulls u toward w, if w and u have angle
< 90◦; or (B) pushes u away from w if their angle is > 90◦.
There is a precise mapping from Hamiltonian games to sym-
plectic geometry, see Appendix E. Symplectic geometry is
the modern formulation of classical mechanics. Recall that
periodic behaviors (e.g. orbits) often arise in classical me-
chanics. The orbits lie on the level sets of the Hamiltonian,
which expresses the total energy of the system.
3. Algorithms
Fixed points of potential and Hamiltonian games can be
found by descent on ξ and ∇H respectively. This section
tackles finding stable fixed points in general games.
3.1. Finding fixed points
If the Hessian H(w) is invertible, then ∇H = Hᵀξ = 0
iff ξ = 0. Thus, gradient descent on H converges to fixed
points of ξ. However, there is no guarantee that descent on
H will find a stable fixed point.
Mescheder et al. (2017) propose consensus optimization, a
gradient adjustment of the form
ξ + λ ·Hᵀξ = ξ + λ · ∇H.
Unfortunately, consensus optimization can converge to un-
stable fixed points even in simple cases where the ‘game’ is
to minimize a single function:
Example 5 (consensus optimization converges to global
maximum). Consider a potential game with losses
`1(x, y) = `2(x, y) = −κ2 (x2 + y2) with κ 0. Then
ξ = −κ ·
(
x
y
)
and H = −
(
κ 0
0 κ
)
Note that ‖ξ‖2 = κ2(x2 + y2) and
ξ + λ ·Hᵀξ = κ(λκ− 1) ·
(
x
y
)
.
Descent on ξ + λ ·Hᵀξ converges to the global maximum
(x, y) = (0, 0) unless λ < 1κ .
Although consensus optimization works well in some spe-
cial cases like two-player zero-sum; it cannot be considered
a candidate algorithm for finding stable fixed points in gen-
eral games, since it fails in the basic case of potential games.
Algorithm 1 Symplectic Gradient Adjustment
Input: losses L = {`i}ni=1, weightsW = {wi}ni=1
ξ ← [gradient(`i,wi) for (`i,wi) ∈ (L,W)]
Aᵀξ ← get sym adj(L,W) // appendix C
if align then
∇H ← [gradient( 12‖ξ‖2,w) for w ∈ W)]
λ← sign
(
1
d 〈ξ,∇H〉〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉+ 
)
//  = 110
else
λ← 1
end if
Output: ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ // plug into any optimizer
3.2. Finding stable fixed points
There are two classes of games where we know how to find
stable fixed points: potential games where ξ converges to a
local minimum and Hamiltonian games where ∇H, which
is orthogonal to ξ, finds stable fixed points. In the general
case, the following desiderata provide a set of reasonable
properties for an adjustment ξλ of the game dynamics:
Desiderata. To find stable fixed points, an adjustment ξλ
to the game dynamics should satisfy
D1. compatible with game dynamics: 〈ξλ, ξ〉 = α1 · ‖ξ‖2;
D2. compatible with potential dynamics: if the game is a
potential game then 〈ξλ,∇φ〉 = α2 · ‖∇φ‖2;
D3. compatible with Hamiltonian dynamics: If the game is
Hamiltonian then 〈ξλ,∇H〉 = α3 · ‖∇H‖2;
D4. attracted to stable equilibria: in neighborhoods where
S  0, require θ(ξλ,∇H) ≤ θ(ξ,∇H);
D5. repelled by unstable equilibria: in neighborhoods
where S ≺ 0, require θ(ξλ,∇H) ≥ θ(ξ,∇H);
for some α1, α2, α3 > 0.
Desideratum D1 does not guarantee that players act in their
own self-interest – this requires a stronger positivity con-
dition on dot-products with subvectors of ξ, see Balduzzi
(2017). Desiderata D4 and D5 are explained in section 3.4.
The unadjusted dynamics ξ satisfies all the desiderata ex-
cept D3. Consensus optimization only satisfies D3 and D4.
Ideally, desideratum D5 would be strengthened to ‘repelled
by saddle points where ξ(w) = 0 but S(w) 6 0’.
3.3. Symplectic gradient adjustment
Proposition 4. The symplectic gradient adjustment (SGA)
ξλ := ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ.
satisfies D1–D3 for λ > 0, with α1 = 1 = α2 and α3 = λ.
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Note that desiderata D1 and D2 are true even when λ < 0.
This will prove useful, since example 6 and theorem 5 show
it is necessary pick negative λ near S ≺ 0. Section 3.4
shows how to also satisfy desiderata D4 and D5.
Proof. First claim: λ ·ξᵀAᵀξ = 0 by skew-symmetry of A.
Second claim: A ≡ 0 in a potential game, so ξλ = ξ = ∇φ.
Third claim: 〈ξλ,∇H〉 = 〈ξλ,Hᵀξ〉 = 〈ξλ,Aᵀξ〉 = λ ·
ξᵀAAᵀξ = λ · ‖∇H‖2 since H = A by assumption and
since ξᵀAᵀξ = 0 by antisymmetry.
In the example below, almost any choice of positive λ results
in convergence to an unstable equilibrium. The problem
arises from the combination of a weak repellor with a strong
rotational force. The next section shows how to pick λ to
avoid unstable equilibria.
Example 6 (failure case for λ > 0). Suppose  > 0 is small
and
f(x, y) = − 
2
x2 − xy and g(x, y) = − 
2
y2 + xy
with an unstable equilibrium at (0, 0). The dynamics are
ξ =  ·
(−x
−y
)
+
(−y
x
)
with A =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
and
Aᵀξ =
(
x
y
)
+ 
(−y
x
)
Finally observe that
ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ = (λ− ) ·
(
x
y
)
+ (1 + λ) ·
(−y
x
)
which converges to the unstable equilibrium if λ > .
Lemma 9 in the appendix shows that, if S and A commute
and S  0, then 〈ξλ,∇H〉 ≥ 0 for λ > 0. The proof
of theorem 5 introduces the additive condition number to
upper-bound the worst-case noncommutativity of S, which
allows to quantify the relationship between ξλ and ∇H.
Theorem 5. Let S be a symmetric matrix with eigenvalues
σmax ≥ · · · ≥ σmin. The additive condition number4 of S
is κ = σmax − σmin. If S  0 is positive semidefinite with
additive condition number κ then λ ∈ (0, 4κ ) implies
〈ξλ,∇H〉 ≥ 0.
If S is negative semidefinite, then λ ∈ (0, 4κ ) implies
〈ξ−λ,∇H〉 ≤ 0.
The inequalities are strict if H is invertible.
If κ = 0, then S = σ · I commutes with all matrices.
The larger the additive condition number κ, the larger the
potential failure of S to commute with other matrices.
4The condition number of a positive definite matrix is σmax
σmin
.
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Figure 3. SGA allows faster and more robust convergence to stable
fixed points. Note the scale of top-right panel differs from rest.
3.4. How to pick sign(λ)
This section explains desiderata D4–D5 and shows how to
pick sign(λ) to speed up convergence towards stable and
away from unstable fixed points.
First, observe that 〈ξ,∇H〉 = ξᵀ(S + A)ᵀξ = ξᵀSξ. It
follows that for ξ 6= 0:{
if S  0 then 〈ξ,∇H〉 ≥ 0;
if S ≺ 0 then 〈ξ,∇H〉 < 0. (1)
A criterion to probe the positive/negative definiteness of S
is thus to check the sign of 〈ξ,∇H〉. The dot product can
take any value if S is not positive nor negative definite. The
behavior near saddles is beyond the scope of the paper.
Desiderata D4 can be interpreted as follows. If ξ points at
a stable equilibrium then we require that ξλ points more
towards the equilibrium (i.e. has smaller angle). Conversely
if ξ points away then the adjustment should point further
away. More formally,
Definition 4. Let u and v be two vectors. The infinitesimal
alignment of ξλ := u+ λ · v with a third vector w is
align(ξλ,w) :=
d
dλ
{
cos2 θλ
}
|λ=0 for θλ := θ(ξλ,w).
If u and w point the same way, uᵀw > 0, then align > 0
when v bends u further toward w, see figure 2A. Otherwise
align > 0 when v bends u away from w, figure 2B.
Proposition 6. Desiderata D4–D5 are satisfied for λ such
that λ · 〈ξ,∇H〉 · 〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉 ≥ 0.
Computing the sign of 〈ξ,∇H〉 provides a check for sta-
ble and unstable fixed points. Computing the sign of
〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉 checks whether the adjustment term points to-
wards or away from the (nearby) fixed point. Putting the
two checks together yields a prescription for the sign of λ.
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Figure 4. Comparison of SGA with optimistic mirror descent.
Sweep over learning rates in range [0.01, 1.75]; λ = 1 throughout.
(Left): iterations to convergence (up to 250). (Right): average
absolute value of losses over iterations 240-250, cutoff at 5.
Alignment and convergence rates. Finally, we show that
increasing alignment helps speed convergence. Gradient
descent is also known as the method of steepest descent. In
general games, however, ξ does not follow the steepest path
to fixed points due to the ‘rotational force’, which forces
lower learning rates and slows down convergence:
Theorem 7. Suppose f is convex and Lipschitz smooth with
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ L · ‖x− y‖. Let wt+1 = wt− η · v
where ‖v‖ = ‖∇f(wt)‖. Then the optimal step size is
η∗ = cos θL where θ := θ(∇f(wt),v), with
f(wt+1) ≤ f(wt)− cos
2 θ
2L
· ‖∇f(wt)‖2.
Increasing the cosine with the steepest direction improves
convergence. The alignment computation in algorithm 1
chooses λ to be positive or negative such that ξλ is bent
towards stable (increasing the cosine) and away from unsta-
ble fixed points. Adding a small  > 0 to the computation
introduces a weak bias towards stable fixed points.
3.5. Aligned consensus optimization
The stability criterion in (1) also provides a simple way to
prevent consensus optimization from converging to unstable
equilibria. Aligned consensus optimization is
ξ + |λ| · sign
(
〈ξ,∇H〉
)
·Hᵀξ, (2)
where in practice we set λ = 1. Aligned consensus satisfies
desiderata D3–D5. However, it behaves strangely in poten-
tial games. Multiplying by the Hessian is the ‘inverse’ of
Newton’s method: it increases the gap between small and
large eigenvalues, increasing the (usual, multiplicative) con-
dition number and slows down convergence. Nevertheless,
consensus optimization works well in GANs (Mescheder
et al., 2017), and aligned consensus may improve perfor-
mance, see figure 9 in appendix.
Finally, note that dropping the first term ξ from (2) yields
a simpler update that also satisfies D3–D5. However, the
resulting algorithm performs poorly in experiments (not
shown), perhaps because it is attracted to saddles.
4. Experiments
We compare SGA with simultaneous gradient descent, opti-
mistic mirror descent (Daskalakis et al., 2018) and consen-
sus optimization (Mescheder et al., 2017) in basic settings.
4.1. Learning rates and alignment
We investigate the effect of SGA when a weak attractor is
coupled to a strong rotational force:
`1(x, y) =
1
2
x2 + 10xy and `2(x, y) =
1
2
y2 − 10xy
Gradient descent is extremely sensitive to the choice of
learning rate η, top row of figure 3. As η increases through
{0.01, 0.032, 0.1} gradient descent goes from converging
extremely slowly, to diverging slowly, to diverging rapidly.
SGA yields faster, more robust convergence. SGA con-
verges faster with learning rates η = 0.01 and η = 0.032,
and only starts overshooting the fixed point for η = 0.1.
4.2. Basic adversarial games
Figure 4 compares SGA with optimistic mirror descent on
a zero-sum bimatrix game with `1/2(w1,w2) = ±wᵀ1w2.
The example is modified from Daskalakis et al. (2018) who
also consider a linear offset that makes no difference. A run
converges, panel A, if the average absolute value of losses
on the last 10 iterations is < 0.01.
Although OMD’s peak performance is better than SGA, we
find that SGA converges – and does so faster – for a wider
range of learning rates. OMD diverges for learning rates
not in the range [0.3, 1.2]. Simultaneous gradient descent
oscillates without converging (not shown). Individual runs
are shown in the appendix. The appendix also compares the
performance of the algorithms on four-player games.
4.3. Generative adversarial networks
We apply SGA to a basic setup adapted from Metz et al.
(2017). Data is sampled from a highly multimodal distribu-
tion designed to probe the tendency to collapse onto a subset
of modes during training. The distribution is a mixture of
16 Gaussians arranged in a 4× 4 grid, see ground truth in
figure 8. The generator and discriminator networks both
have 6 ReLU layers of 384 neurons. The generator has two
output neurons; the discriminator has one.
Figure 5 shows results after {2000, 4000, 6000, 8000} iter-
ations. The networks are trained under RMSProp. Learning
rates were chosen by visual inspection of grid search re-
sults at iteration 8000, see appendix. Simultaneous gradient
descent and SGA are shown in the figure. Results for con-
sensus optimization are in the appendix.
Simultaneous gradient descent exhibits mode collapse fol-
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Figure 5. Top: Simultaneous gradient descent suffers from mode collapse and in later iterations (not shown) mode hopping. Middle:
vanilla SGA converges smoothly to the ground truth (figure 8 in appendix). Bottom: SGA with alignment converges slightly faster.
lowed by mode hopping in later iterations (not shown).
Mode hopping is analogous to the cycles in example 1. Un-
aligned SGA converges to the correct distribution; alignment
speeds up convergence slightly. Consensus optimization per-
forms similarly, see figure 9 in the appendix. However, it
can converge to local maxima, recall example 5.
5. Discussion
Modern deep learning treats differentiable modules like
plug-and-play lego blocks. For this to work, at the very
least, we need to know that gradient descent will find local
minima. Unfortunately, gradient descent does not necessar-
ily find local minima when optimizing multiple interacting
objectives. With the recent proliferation of algorithms that
optimize more than one loss, it is becoming increasingly
urgent to understand and control the dynamics of interacting
losses. Although there is interesting recent work on two-
player adversarial games such as GANs, there is essentially
no work on finding stable fixed points in general.
The generalized Helmholtz decomposition provides a pow-
erful new perspective on game dynamics. A key feature
is that the analysis is indifferent to the number of players.
Instead, it is the interplay between the simultaneous gradi-
ent ξ on the losses and the symmetric and antisymmetric
matrices of second-order terms that guides algorithm design
and governs the dynamics under gradient adjustments.
Symplectic gradient adjustment is a straightforward appli-
cation of the Helmholtz decomposition. It is unlikely that
SGA is the only or best approach to finding stable fixed
points. A deeper understanding of the interaction between
the potential and Hamiltonian components will lead to more
effective algorithms. Of particular interest are pure first-
order methods that do not use Hessian-vector products.
Finally, it is worth raising a philosophical point. The goal in
this paper is to find stable fixed points (e.g. because in GANs
they yield pleasing samples). We are not concerned with
the losses of the players per se. The gradient adjustments
may lead to a player acting against its own self-interest by
increasing its loss. We consider this acceptable insofar as it
encourages convergence to a stable fixed point.
Acknowledgements. We thank Guillame Desjardins, Csaba
Szepesvari and especially Alistair Letcher for useful feed-
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APPENDIX
A. Stable fixed points vs local Nash equilibria
The main text introduces two solutions concepts for gen-
eral games: stable fixed points and local Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2 shows that if w∗ is a stable fixed point then it is
also a local Nash equilibrium. If the game is two-player
zero-sum, then the converse also holds:
Lemma 8 (local Nash equilibria are stable fixed points in
two-player zero-sum games). If a game is two-player zero-
sum, then local Nash equilibria are stable fixed points.
Proof. Consider a two-player zero-sum game with losses
f(x,y) and g(x,y) = −f(x,y).
Then ξ = (∇xf,−∇yf) and
H =
( ∇2x,xf ∇2x,yf
−∇2y,xf −∇2y,yf
)
=
(∇2x,xf 0
0 −∇2y,yf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
+
(
0 ∇2x,yf
−∇2y,xf 0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
Thus, S is positive semidefinite iff the blocks ∇2x,xf and
∇2y,yg = −∇2y,yf are both positive semidefinite. The result
follows.
The following example, due to Alistair Letcher, shows there
are local Nash equilibria that are not stable fixed points:
Example 7 (a local Nash equilibrium that is not stable). Let
`1(x, y) =
x2
2
+ 2xy and `2(x, y) =
y2
2
+ 2xy
Then
ξ =
(
x+ 2y
y + 2x
)
and H =
(
1 2
2 1
)
.
There is a fixed point at (x, y) = (0, 0) which is a local
Nash equilibrium since ∂
2
∂x2 `1(0, 0) = 1 =
∂2
∂y2 `2(0, 0) > 0.
However, S = H has eigenvalues λ1 = 3 and λ2 = −1,
and so is not positive semidefinite.
Which is the ‘right’ solution concept? We prefer stable
fixed points. In the case of GANs (two-player zero-sum)
there is no difference between the solution concepts by
lemma 8. However, the solution concepts differ for potential
games. Example 7 is a potential game since S = H. It is
easy to check that the potential function
φ(x, y) =
x2
2
+ 2xy +
y2
2
satisfies ξ = ∇φ and H = ∇2φ. The Nash equilibrium
is a saddle-point for the potential function. An algorithm
that is guaranteed to converge to the Nash equilibrium in
example 7 is thus guaranteed to converge to the saddle point
of the potential function φ.
This rules out local Nash equilibrium as a solution concept
for our purposes – since desideratum D2 is that the gradient
adjustment behaves well for potential games and converging
to saddles of the potential function does not count as good
behavior.
B. Proofs
Proof of theorem 3.
Proof. Direct computation shows ∇H = Hᵀξ for any
game. The first statement follows since H = A in Hamil-
tonian games. For the second statement, the directional
derivative is DξH = 〈ξ,∇H〉 = ξᵀAᵀξ where ξᵀAᵀξ =
(ξᵀAᵀξ)ᵀ = ξᵀAξ = −(ξᵀAᵀξ) since A = −Aᵀ by
skew-symmetry. It follows that ξᵀAᵀξ = 0.
For the third, gradient descent onH will converge to a point
where ∇H = Hᵀξ(w) = 0. If the Hessian is invertible
then clearly ξ(w) = 0. The fixed-point is a local Nash
equilibrium by Lemma 2 since 0 ≡ S  0 in a Hamiltonian
game.
Proof of theorem 5. The following lemma, whilst not
used in the proof of theorem 5, nevertheless provides a
useful intuition about the role of commutativity.
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Recall that two matrices A and S commute iff [A,S] :=
AS− SA = 0. That is, iff AS = SA.
Lemma 9. If S  0 is symmetric positive semidefinite and
S commutes with A then
〈ξλ,∇H〉 ≥ 0 for all λ ≥ 0.
Proof. First observe that ξᵀASξ = ξᵀSᵀAᵀξ =
−ξᵀSAξ, where the first equality holds since the expres-
sion is a scalar, and the second holds since S = Sᵀ and
A = −Aᵀ. It follows that ξᵀASξ = 0 if SA = AS.
Rewrite the inequality as
〈ξλ ·Aᵀξ,∇H〉 = 〈ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ,Sξ +Aᵀξ〉
= ξᵀSξ + λξᵀAAᵀξ ≥ 0
since ξᵀASξ = 0 and by positivity of S, λ and AAᵀ.
The proof of the theorem follows.
Proof. We prove the case S  0; the case S  0 is similar.
Rewrite the inequality as
〈ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ,∇H〉 = (ξ + λ ·Aᵀξ)ᵀ · (S+Aᵀ)ξ
= ξᵀSξ + λξᵀASξ + λξᵀAAᵀξ
Let β = ‖Aᵀξ‖ and S˜ = S−σmin ·I, where I is the identity
matrix. Then
ξᵀSξ + λξᵀASξ + λ · β2 ≥ ξᵀS˜ξ + λξᵀAS˜ξ + λ · β2
since ξᵀSξ ≥ ξᵀS˜ξ by construction and ξᵀAS˜ξ =
ξᵀASξ − σminξᵀAξ = ξᵀASξ because ξᵀAξ = 0 by
the skew-symmetry of A. It therefore suffices to show that
the inequality holds when σmin = 0 and κ = σmax.
Since S is positive semidefinite, there exists an upper-
triangular square-root matrix T such that TᵀT = S and so
ξᵀSξ = ‖Tξ‖2. Further,
|ξᵀASξ| ≤ ‖Aᵀξ‖·‖TᵀTξ‖ ≤ √σmax ·‖Aᵀξ‖·‖Tξ‖.
since ‖T‖2 = √σmax. Putting the observations together
obtains
‖Tξ‖2 + λ(‖Aξ‖2 − 〈Aξ,Sξ〉)
≥‖Tξ‖2 + λ(‖Aξ‖2 − ‖Aξ‖ ‖Sξ‖
≥‖Tξ‖2 + λ‖Aξ‖(‖Aξ‖ − ‖Sξ‖)
≥‖Tξ‖2 + λ‖Aξ‖(‖Aξ‖ − √σmax‖Tξ‖)
Set α =
√
λ and η =
√
σmax. We can continue the above
computation
=‖Tξ‖2 + α2‖Aξ‖(‖Aξ‖ − η‖Tξ‖)
=‖Tξ‖2 + α2‖Aξ‖2 − α2‖Aξ‖η‖Tξ‖
=(‖Tξ‖ − α‖Aξ‖)2 + 2α‖Aξ‖ ‖Tξ‖ − α2η‖Aξ‖ ‖Tξ‖
=(‖Tξ‖ − α‖Aξ‖)2 + ‖Aξ‖ ‖Tξ‖(2α− α2η)
Finally, 2α− α2η > 0 for any α in the range (0, 2η ), which
is to say, for any 0 < λ < 4σmax . The kernel of S and the
kernel of T coincide. If ξ is in the kernel of A, resp. T, it
cannot be in the kernel of T, resp. A and the term (‖Tξ‖−
α‖Aξ‖)2 is positive. Otherwise, the term ‖Aξ‖‖Tξ‖ is
positive.
Proof of proposition 6.
Lemma 10. When ξλ is the symplectic gradient adjustment,
sign
(
align(ξλ,∇H)
)
= sign
(
〈ξ,∇H〉 · 〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉
)
.
Proof. Observe that
cos2 θλ =
( 〈ξλ,∇H〉
‖ξλ‖ · ‖∇H‖
)2
=
〈ξ,∇H〉+ 2λ〈ξ,∇H〉〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉+O(λ2)(‖ξ‖2 +O(λ2)) · ‖∇H‖2
where the denominator has no linear term in λ because
ξ ⊥ Aᵀξ. It follows that the sign of the infinitesimal
alignment is
sign
{
d
dλ
cos2 θλ
}
= sign
{
〈ξ,∇H〉〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉
}
as required.
The proposition follows easily.
Proof. If we are in a neighborhood of a stable fixed
point then 〈ξ,∇H〉 ≥ 0. It follows by lemma 10 that
sign
(
align(ξλ),∇H)
)
= sign
(
〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉
)
and so
choosing sign(λ) = sign
(
〈Aᵀξ,∇H〉
)
leads to the angle
between ξλ and∇H being smaller than the angle between
ξ and ∇H, satisfying desideratum D4.
The proof for the unstable case is similar.
Proof of theorem 7. The following lemma provides some
intuition for theorem 7. The idea is that, the smaller the
cosine between the ‘correct direction’ w and the ‘update
direction’ ξ, the smaller the learning rate needs to be for the
update to stay in a unit ball, see figure 6.
Lemma 11 (alignment lemma). If w and ξ are unit vectors
with 0 < wᵀξ then ‖w − η · ξ‖ ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ η ≤ 2wᵀξ.
Proof. Check ‖w − η · ξ‖2 = 1 + η2 − 2η ·wᵀξ ≤ 1 iff
η2 ≤ 2η ·wᵀξ. The result follows.
The next lemma is a standard technical result (e.g. Nesterov,
2004).
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w w
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Figure 6. Alignment and learning rates. The larger cos θ, the larger
the learning rate η that can be applied to unit vector ξ without
w + η · ξ leaving the unit circle.
Lemma 12. Let f : Rd → R be a convex Lipschitz smooth
function satisfying ‖∇f(y) −∇f(x)‖ ≤ L · ‖y − x‖ for
all x,y ∈ Rd. Then
|f(y)− f(x)− 〈∇f(x),y − x〉| ≤ L
2
· ‖y − x‖2
for all x,y ∈ Rd.
Finally the proof of the theorem is adapted from a standard
result in Nesterov (2004), where there is no cosine.
Proof. By the above lemma,
f(y) ≤ f(x) + 〈∇f(x),y − x〉+ L
2
‖y − x‖2
= f(x)− η · 〈∇f, ξ〉+ η2L
2
· ‖ξ‖2
= f(x)− η · 〈∇f, ξ〉+ η2L
2
· ‖∇f‖2
= f(x)− η(α− η
2
L) · ‖∇f‖2
where α := cos θ. Solve
min
η
∆(η) = min
η
{
−η(α− η
2
L)
}
to obtain η∗ = αL and ∆(η
∗) = −α22 L as required.
C. TensorFlow code to computeAᵀξ:
The code requires a list of n losses, Ls, and a list of variables
for the n players, xs. The function fwd gradients is in
the module tf.contrib.kfac.utils.
def jac vec(ys, xs, vs) :
return fwd gradients(ys, xs,
grad xs = vs,stop gradients = xs)
def jac tran vec(ys, xs, vs) :
dydxs = tf.gradients(ys, xs,grad ys = vs,
stop gradients = xs)
return [tf.zeros like(x) if dydx is None
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Figure 7. Time to convergence of OMD and SGA on two 4-player
games. Times are cutoff after 5000 iterations. Left panel: Weakly
positive definite S with  = 1
100
. Right panel: Symmetric com-
ponent is identically zero.
else dydx
for (x, dydx) in zip(xs, dydxs)]
def get sym adj(Ls, xs) :
xi = [tf.gradients(`, x)[0]
for (`, x) in zip(Ls, xs)]
H xi = jac vec(xi, xs, xi)
Ht xi = jac tran vec(xi, xs, xi)
At xi = [ ht−h
2
for (h, ht) in zip(H xi, Ht xi)]
return At xi
D. Further experiments
OMD and SGA on a four-player game. Figure 7 shows
time to convergence (same criterion as section 4.2 for opti-
mistic mirror descent and SGA. The games are constructed
with four players, each of which controls one parameter.
The losses are
`1(w, x, y, z) =

2
w2 + wx+ wy + wz
`2(w, x, y, z) = −wx+ 
2
x2 + xy + xz
`3(w, x, y, z) = −wy − xy + 
2
y2 + yz
`4(w, x, y, z) = −wz − xz − yz + 
2
z2,
where  = 1100 in the left panel and  = 0 in the right panel.
The antisymmetric component of the game Hessian is
A =

0 1 1 1
−1 0 1 1
−1 −1 0 1
−1 −1 −1 0

and the symmetric component is
S =  ·

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 .
OMD converges considerably slower than SGA across the
full range of learning rates. It also diverges for learning
rates > 0.22. SGA converges more quickly and robustly.
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Figure 8. Ground truth for GAN experiments. A mixture of 16
Gaussians.
Ground truth for GAN experiments. Figure 8 shows
the probability distribution that is sampled to train the gen-
erator and discriminator in the GAN example.
More details on GAN experiments. Figure 9 shows the
performance of consensus optimization without and with
alignment. Introducing alignment slightly improves speed
of convergence (second column) and final result (fourth
column), although intermediate results in third column are
ambiguous.
Grid search was over learning rates {1e-5, 2e-5,5e-5, 8e-5,
1e-4, 2e-4, 5e-4} and then a more refined linear search over
[8e-5, 2e-4].
E. Helmholtz, Hamilton, Hodge, and
Harmonic games
This section explains the mathematical connections with
the Helmholtz decomposition, symplectic geometry and the
Hodge decomposition. The discussion is not necessary to
understand the main text. It is also not self-contained. The
details can be found in textbooks covering differential and
symplectic geometry.
E.1. The Helmholtz decomposition
The classical Helmholtz decomposition states that any vec-
tor field ξ in 3-dimensions is the sum of curl-free (gradient)
and divergence-free (infinitesimal rotation) components:
ξ = ∇φ︸︷︷︸
gradient component
+ curl(B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
rotational component
[
curl(•) := ∇×(•)
]
We explain the link between curl and the antisymmetric
component of the game Hessian. Recall that gradients of
functions are actually differential 1-forms, not vector fields.
Differential 1-forms and vector fields on a manifold are
canonically isomorphic once a Riemannian metric has been
chosen. In our case, we are implicitly using the Euclidean
metric. The antisymmetric matrix A is the differential 2-
form obtained by applying the exterior derivative d to the
1-form ξ.
In 3-dimensions, the Hodge star operator is an isormorphism
from differential 2-forms to vector fields, and the curl can
be reformulated as curl(•) = ∗d(•). In claiming A is
analogous to curl, we are simply dropping the Hodge-star
operator.
Finally, recall that the Lie algebra of infinitesimal rotations
in d-dimensions is given by antisymmetric matrices. When
d = 3, the Lie algebra can be represented as vectors (three
numbers specify a 3 × 3 antisymmetric matrix) with the
×-product as Lie bracket. In general, the antisymmetric
matrix A captures the infinitesimal tendency of ξ to rotate
at each point in the parameter space.
E.2. Hamiltonian mechanics
A symplectic form ω is a closed nondegenerate differential
2-form. Given a manifold with a symplectic form, a vector
field ξ is Hamiltonian vector field if there exists a function
H : M → R satisfying
ω(ξ, •) = dH(•) = 〈∇H, •〉. (3)
The function is then referred to as the Hamiltonian function
of the vector field. In our case, the antisymmetric matrix A
is a closed 2-form because A = dξ and d ◦ d = 0. It may
however be degenerate. It is therefore a presymplectic form
(Bottacin, 2005).
Setting ω = A, equation (3) can be rewritten in our notation
as
ω(ξ, •)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aᵀξ
= dH(•)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∇H
,
justifying the terminology ‘Hamiltonian’.
E.3. The Hodge decomposition
The exterior derivative dk : Ωk(M)→ Ωk+1(M) is a linear
operator that takes differential k-forms on a manifold M ,
Ωk(M), to differential k + 1-forms, Ωk+1(M). In the case
k = 0, the exterior derivative is the gradient, which takes
0-forms (that is, functions) to 1-forms. Given a Riemannian
metric, the adjoint of the exterior derivative δ goes in the
opposite direction. Hodge’s theorem states that k-forms on
a compact manifold decompose into a direct sum over three
types:
Ωk(M) = dΩk−1(M)⊕Harmonick(M)⊕ δΩk+1(M).
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Figure 9. Top: Consensus optimization on GAN example. Bottom: Consensus optimization with alignment.
Setting k = 1, we recover a decomposition that closely
resembles the generalized Helmholtz decomposition:
Ω1(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-forms
= dΩ0(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients of functions
⊕Harmk(M)⊕ δΩ2(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
antisymmetric component
The harmonic component is isomorphic to the de Rham
cohomology of the manifold – which is zero when k = 1
and M = Rn.
Unfortunately, the Hodge decomposition does not straight-
forwardly apply to the case when M = Rn, since Rn is not
compact. It is thus unclear how to relate the generalized
Helmholtz decomposition to the Hodge decomposition.
E.4. Harmonic and potential games
Candogan et al. (2011) derive a Hodge decomposition for
games that is closely related in spirit to our generalized
Helmholtz decomposition – although the details are quite
different. Candogan et al. (2011) work with classical games
(probability distributions on finite strategy sets). Their
losses are multilinear, which is easier than our setting, but
they have constrained solution sets, which is harder in many
ways. Their approach is based on combinatorial Hodge the-
ory rather than differential and symplectic geometry. Find-
ing a best-of-both-worlds approach that encompasses both
settings is an open problem.
F. Type consistency
The next two sections carefully work through the units in
classical mechanics and two-player games respectively. The
third section briefly describes a use-case for type consis-
tency.
F.1. Units in classical mechanics
Consider the well-known Hamiltonian
H(p, q) = 1
2
(
κ · q2 + 1
µ
· p2
)
where q is position, p = µ · q˙ is momentum, µ is mass, κ is
surface tension andH measures energy. The units (denoted
by τ ) are
τ(q) = m τ(p) = kg·ms
τ(κ) = kgs2 τ(µ) = kg
wherem is meters, kg is kilograms and s is seconds. Energy
is measured in joules, and indeed it is easy to check that
τ(H) = kg·m2s2 .
Note that the units for differentation by x are τ( ∂∂x ) =
1
τ(x) .
For example, differentiating by time has units 1s . Hamilton’s
equations state that q˙ = ∂H∂p =
1
µ ·p and p˙ = −∂H∂q = −κ ·q
where
τ(q˙) = ms τ(p˙) =
kg·m
s2
τ
(
∂
∂q
)
= 1m τ
(
∂
∂p
)
= skg·m
The resulting flow describing the dynamics of the system is
ξ = q˙ · ∂
∂q
+ p˙ · ∂
∂p
=
1
µ
p · ∂
∂q
− κq · ∂
∂p
with units τ(ξ) = 1s . Hamilton’s equations can be reformu-
lated more abstractly via symplectic geometry. Introduce
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the symplectic form
ω = dq ∧ dp with units τ(ω) = kg ·m
2
s
.
Observe that contracting the flow with the Hamiltonian
obtains
ιξω = ω(ξ, •) = dH = ∂H
∂q
· dq + ∂H
∂p
· dp
with units τ(dH) = τ(H) = kg·m2s2 .
Losses in classical mechanics. Although there is no no-
tion of “loss” in classical mechanics, it is useful (for the
next section) to keep pushing the formal analogy. Define
the “losses”
`1(q, p) =
1
µ
· qp and `2(q, p) = −κ · qp (4)
with units τ(`1) = m
2
s and τ(`2) =
kg2·m2
s3 . The Hamilto-
nian dynamics can then be recovered game-theoretically by
differentiating `1 and `2 with respect to q and p respectively.
It is easy to check that
ξ =
∂H
∂p
∂
∂q
− ∂H
∂q
∂
∂p
=
∂`1
∂q
∂
∂q
+
∂`2
∂p
∂
∂p
.
The duality between vector fields and differential forms.
Finally recall that the symplectic form in games was not
“pulled out of thin air” as ω = dq ∧ dp, but rather derived as
ω = dξ[, where ξ[ is the differential form corresponding to
the vector field ξ under the musical isomorphism [ : TM →
T ∗M .
It is instructive to compute ξ[ in the case of a classical
mechanical system and see what happens. Naively, we
would guess that the musical isomorphism is
(
∂
∂q
)[
= dq
and
(
∂
∂p
)[
= dp. However, applying the naive musical
isomorphism to ξ to get
ξ[ =
∂`1
∂q
· dq + ∂`2
∂p
· dp
results in a type violation because
τ
(
∂`1
∂q
· dq
)
= τ(`1) =
m2
s
whereas
τ
(
∂`2
∂p
· dp
)
= τ(`2) =
kg2 ·m2
s3
and we cannot add objects with different types.
To correct the type inconsistency, define the musical isomor-
phism as(
∂
∂q
)[
=
µ
2
· dq and
(
∂
∂p
)[
=
1
2κ
· dp
with inverse
(dq)
]
=
2
µ
· ∂
∂q
and (dp)] = 2κ · ∂
∂p
.
The correction terms in the direction [ : TM → T ∗M
invert the coupling terms κ and 1µ that were originally intro-
duced into the Hamiltonian for physical reasons. Applying
the corrected musical isomorphism to ξ yields
ξ[ =
µ
2
· ∂f
∂q
· dq + 1
2κ
· ∂g
∂p
· dp = 1
2
(p · dq − q · dp) .
The two terms of ξ[ then have coherent types
τ
(
∂`1
∂q · µ · dq
)
= ms · kg ·m = kg·m
2
s
τ
(
∂`2
∂p · 1κ · dp
)
= kg·ms2 · s
2
kg · kg·ms = kg·m
2
s
as required. The associated two form is
ω := dξ[ = −
(
µ · ∂
2f
∂q∂p
− 1
κ
· ∂
2g
∂q∂p
)
dq∧dp = −dq∧dp
which recovers the symplectic form (up to sign) with units
τ(ω) = kg·m
2
s as required. Finally, observe that
〈ξ, ξ[〉 = 1
2
〈
p
µ
· ∂
∂q
− κq · ∂
∂p
, p · dq − q · dp
〉
=
1
2
(
κ · q2 + 1
µ
· p2
)
= H(p, q)
recovering the Hamiltonian.
F.2. Units in two-player games
Without loss of generality let w = (x;y) where we refer
to x as position and y as momentum so that τ(x) = m
and τ(y) = kg·ms . The aim of this section is to check type-
consistency under these, rather arbitrarily assigned, units.
Since we are considering a game, we do not require that x
and y have the same dimension – even though this would
necessarily be the case for a physical system. The goal is to
verify that units can be consistently assigned to games.
Consider a quadratic two player game of the form
`1(w) =
1
2
(
xᵀ yᵀ
)(A11 A12
A21 A22
)(
x
y
)
+
(
xᵀ yᵀ
)(b1
b2
)
and
`2(w) =
1
2
(
xᵀ yᵀ
)(C11 C12
C21 C22
)(
x
y
)
+
(
xᵀ yᵀ
)(d1
d2
)
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We restrict to quadratic games since our methods only in-
volve first and second derivatives. We assume the matrices
A and C are symmetric without loss of generality so that,
for example, A12 = A
ᵀ
21. Adding constant terms to `1 and
`2 makes no difference to the analysis so they are omitted.
By (4), the units for `1 and `2 should be m
2
s and
kg·m2
s3
respectively. We can therefore derive the correct units for
each of the components of the quadratic losses as
(
m kg·ms
) 1s 1kg
1
kg
s
kg2
 m
kg·m
s

︸ ︷︷ ︸
wᵀAw
+
(
m kg·ms
)ms
m
kg

︸ ︷︷ ︸
wᵀb
for `1 and
(
m kg·ms
)kg2s3 kgs2
kg
s2
1
s
 m
kg·m
s

︸ ︷︷ ︸
wᵀCw
+
(
m kg·ms
)kg2·ms3
kg·m
s2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
wᵀd
for `2. It follows from a straightforward computation that
the vector field ξ = ∂`1∂x
∂
∂x +
∂`2
∂y
∂
∂y has type τ(ξ) =
1
s as
required.
The presymplectic form ω = dξ[ makes use of the musical
isomorphism [ : TM → T ∗M . As in section F.1, if we
naively define ( ∂∂x )
[ = dx and ( ∂∂y )
[ = dy then
ξ[ =
∂`1
∂x
· dx+ ∂`2
∂y
· dy
which is type inconsistent because τ(∂`1∂x · dx) = m
2
s and
τ(∂`2∂y · dy) = kg
2·m2
s3 .
Type-consistency via SVD. It is necessary, as in sec-
tion F.1, to correct the naive musical isomorphism by taking
into account the coupling constants for the mixed position-
momentum terms. In the classical setup the coupling con-
stants were the scalars 1µ and κ, whereas in a game they are
the off-diagonal blocks A12 and C12.
Apply singular value decomposition to factorize
A12 = U
ᵀ
ADAVA and C12 = U
ᵀ
CDCVC
where the entries of the diagonal matrices have types
τ(DA) =
1
kg and τ(DC) =
kg
s2 , and the types of the or-
thogonal matrices U and V are pure scalars. The diagonal
matrices DA and DC have the same types as 1µ and κ in
the classical system since they play the same coupling role.
Extending the procedure adopted in the section F.1, fix the
type-inconsistency by defining the musical isomorphisms as(
∂
∂x
)[
= UᵀAD
−1
A UA · dx
and (
∂
∂y
)[
= VᵀCD
−1
C VC · dy.
Alternatively, the isomorphisms can be computed by noting
that UᵀAD
−1
A UA = (
√
A12A21)
−1 and VᵀCD
−1
C VC =
(
√
C21C12)
−1.
The dual isomorphism ] : T ∗M → TM is then
(dx)
]
= UᵀADAUA ·
∂
∂x
and (dy)] = VᵀCDCVC ·
∂
∂y
If
ξ =
(
A12y + b1
C21x+ d2
)
then it follows that
ξ[ =
(
UᵀAD
−1
A UAb1 +U
ᵀ
AUAy
VᵀCD
−1
C VCd2 +V
ᵀ
CVCx
)
with associated closed two form
ωτ = dξ
[ = − (UᵀAVA −UᵀCVC) dx ∧ dy.
where the notation ωτ emphasizes that the two-form is type-
consistent.
F.3. What does type-consistency buy?
Example 8. Consider the loss functions
f(x, y) = xy and g(x, y) = 2xy,
with ξ = (y, 2x). There is no function φ : R2 → R such
that ∇φ = ξ. However, there is a family of functions
φα(x, y) = α · xy which satisfies〈
ξ,∇φα
〉
= α · (x2 + 2y2) ≥ 0 for all α > 0.
Although ξ is not a potential field, there is a family of
functions on which ξ performs gradient descent – albeit
with coordinate-wise learning rates that may not be optimal.
The vector field ξ arguably does not require adjustment.
This kind of situation often arises when the learning rates
of different parameters are set adaptively during training of
neural nets, by rescaling them by positive numbers.
The vanilla and type-consistent 1-forms corresponding to ξ
are, respectively,
ξ[ = y · dx+ 2x · dy and ξ[τ = y · dx+ x · dy
with
ω = dξ[non = dx ∧ dy and ωτ = dξ[τ = 0.
It follows that the type-consistent symplectic gradient ad-
justment is zero. Type-consistency ‘detects’ that no gradient
adjustment is needed in example 8.
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Figure 10. Individual runs on zero-sum bimatrix game in section 4.2.
